Reuse is a well-known and widely accepted principle in design and programming, that 
Introduction
Modelling is a classical approach to the quantitative evaluation of system behaviour. The definition of an "appropriate" model for a system (a model with an abstraction level that captures the main factors influencing the system performance and dependability attributes while, at the same time, resulting in a model that can be solved with the available tools), is a challenging task, that often requires a good amount of experience and intuition by the modeller. The modeller's job can indeed be eased by an adequate tool support and by a predefined modelling process, that allows a driven identification of the major model components, as well as the identification of the available existing components for reuse, much along the lines of what is done in software engineering with the Object Oriented Design methodology.
The aspect of reuse we focus upon in this paper is inheritance. In object-oriented programming languages inheritance allows the definition of new classes based on already existing one(s), from which attributes and methods definitions are taken at zero programming cost. The basic idea behind inheritance is that an object of a subclass can behave as an object of a superclass, and it has a number of attributes defined as in the superclass. But what does "behaviour" and "attributes" mean when the classes identify performance and dependability models?
The modelling formalism considered in this paper is Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPN) [1] : although no inheritance notions have been defined for GSPN, a number of them is instead available [16, 17] for the untimed Petri nets [15] . Since inheritance for nets is defined on the underlying semantics of P/T nets in terms of transition systems, that represent all possible executions of a system, it is quite straightforward to extend it to our case.
Reuse by inheritance is not a panacea, but simply another support for the modelling process: in this paper we shall discuss the role of inheritance for the definition and reuse of GSPN models of the fault, error and failure (FEF) chain [7] . The application of the inheritance principle to the FEF chain is very natural considering that the basic classification of faults in [7] and the one for errors and failures in [4] is primarily hierarchical.
This work is part of a larger approach to dependability modelling developed in the application field of automation systems as part of the EEC project DepAuDE 1 . The starting point of DepAuDE modelling is a description of the system as a collection of UML [10] class diagrams (CD). From the CD description a basic GSPN model structure is derived [3, 4] , based on previous work on modelling systems by layers named PSR [6] . A GSPN model structure includes: the identification of the relevant net components, the identification of the modelling layer at which each model should be placed, and the formula that allows the combination of the component nets into a single analyzable model. We shall describe PSR in Section 3, and the CD description of the FEF chain in Section 2. While the original DepAuDE CD description refers to automation systems only, the part on FEF is actually more general, and in the presentation of the CD description of the FEF chain done in Section 2 we have abstracted away the explicit reference to automation systems.
The contribution in this paper integrates our previous work presented in [3] , in which a PSR structure for the system is derived starting from the CD description of the system. The associations among classes are systematically used to complete the composition formula of the PSR by identifying the set of transitions involved in the composition operator. A number of predefined models (for example the communication models of [2] and description of resources) are used in [3] . Hierarchies are there suggested as a possible source of reuse, especially for FEF, but the topic is not developed there, since it was marginal with respect to the focus of the paper.
The general idea pursued in this paper, and more generally in the DepAuDE approach to modelling, that is to say to provide some structure to the dependability modelling and realize this through some form of net reuse and/or composition is certainly not new, although, to the best of our knowledge, reuse through inheritance has never been considered in the dependability field.
Thanks to the replication and composition features of the UltraSAN [11] tool, modularity has been exploited by Qureshi and Sanders [13] in the comparison via modelling of various voting algorithms. The decomposition adopted in [13] , as in successive papers, identifies the model components based on the basic system components, but the model of FEF is always embedded and spread among the various components, instead of being, as in [3] , a separate component, with the obvious advantages and disadvantages.
In [5, 14] Betous-Almeida and Kanoun, and Rabah and Kanoun, propose an approach to dependability modelling based on refinement and modularity. The work in [5] starts from a functional "vision" of the system that results in a functional model, that is connected, through an interface model, to a structural model that represents the behaviour of the underlying hardware and software, including hardware and software mechanisms for increasing the system dependability, and the dependencies between them. The work in [5] shares with the DepAuDE approach the underlying belief that a modeller should be provided with some sort of structure to start from, and guidelines on how to extend/complete this structure towards a full model of the system under study. No use of inheritance is explicitly mentioned in Betous-Almeida and Kanoun's work, although it seems a very natural evolution to use inheritance when refinement is involved.
The notion of inheritance has been defined by Van der Aalst and Basten [17] , originally in the context of Workflow nets, and later applied to a wider class of models [16] . A full discussion on inheritance, and of the theory of behavioural equivalence behind it, is not the scope of the paper, that aims indeed at showing how these notions can be of interest for dependability modelling. An, hopefully intuitive, introduction to net inheritance is given in Section 4.
The balance of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes, in UML CD terms, the FEF chain and how it relates to system elements, Section 3 describes the composition of structure of GSPN models of system and FEF based on the PSR approach. Section 2 and 3 are a summary of previous work [3, 4] . Section 4 introduces inheritance in nets and shows the hierarchy of GSPN models for faults (in 4.1), errors (in 4.2) and failures (in 4.3), and it constitutes the central contribution of the paper. Conclusions are written in Section 5.
The Class diagram description of fault, error and failure
The DepAuDE UML dependability scheme is constituted by a set of CDs that describe the system in terms of automation components, automation functions, dependability attributes, and timing requirements, a set of CDs that describe the dependability model in terms of the FEF chain and a set of CDs devoted to the dependability strategy.
Class attributes are used to represent either parameters, whose values have to be provided as input to the specifications, or measures to be computed or upper/lower bounds whose values have to be provided as input to the specification and to be validated at later stages of the development. Different types of usage of class attributes are discriminated by prefixing the name of the attributes with a specific symbol ("$" , "/" or "/$", respectively).
In this paper we only consider the dependability portion of the CD scheme, that includes a hierarchy for each element of the FEF chain (presented in Section 4) and a CD that depicts the FEF cause-effect chain.
We view the system as a layered structure in which a system component realizes a certain function by using a set of resources. Since the pattern of usage of resources can be quite complicated, an intermediate level is added, called services. This point of view on system behavior leads to a three layer structure, represented as the right portion of the CD of Figure 1 .
Relationships between faults, errors and failures as well as their propagation among the system entities is captured by the cause-effect chain shown on the left portion of Figure 1 . Once customized on a specific application it shows which faults provoke which errors and which (set of) errors provoke a failure, that is to say a deviation from the function delivered by the system. The diagram also connects each type of fault, error and failure with the corresponding system entity affected by it, so a fault may affect a resource, an error may affect a service performed on one or more faulty resources, and a failure may affect the whole system if errors are not recovered in due time.
Moreover, if a service is affected by an error, the error can be propagated to another service either performed by the same resource (i.e., internal propagation) or by another resource communicating with the former (i.e., external propagation). This error propagation is represented by the Ecause-Eeffect association.
Since a failure of a system component can be perceived by another component as an external fault (as described in [7] ), an association exists between the fault and the failure classes. This is an aspect that we shall not yet consider in the modelling process.
The PSR modelling approach
To give structure and organization to the Petri Net (PN) model, the work in [3] follows the PSR layered approach proposed in [6] for modelling systems that integrates hardware and software aspects. In PSR a PN model is organized into three levels: resources, services and processes. Resources are at the bottom level, and they provide operations for the services, where a service is basically a complex pattern of use of the resources. Services are then requested by the application model placed at the highest level, called process level.
PSR provides a schema of how the resource and service nets should look like, while the process level can be made up of arbitrary nets. Figure 2 , left part, depicts a model of a resource; transition labels are written in italics. A resource can be idle, and it can offer one or more operations through the sequence of actions start operation, operation, end operation (S perform(Resource,Service) i, op i, E perform(Resource,Service) i), either with or without a lock request. The label is built using the association perform(Resource,Service) of the CD diagram of the FEF chain. From each state in which a fault can be perceived by the resource a transition labeled affect(Fault,Resource) has been added (to be used for synchronization with the fault model) which takes the resource into a faulty state. Again, affect(Fault,Resource) is the association that, in the CD diagram of a specific application, relates a specific type of fault to a specific type of resource affected by that fault. The right part of Figure 2 depicts a skeleton of the process model that uses services: the request of a service is performed through the label perform(Service,System Component) and through a matching function that maps the label into the pair of labels S perform(Service,System Component), E perform(Service,System Component). Also for service and process models, transitions (to be used for synchronization with an error and a failure model, respectively) have been added which take the services/processes into an anomalous state.
When considering also dependability aspects, fault models are placed at the resource level, error models at the service level and failure models at process level. Each level is defined through net composition operators based on transition superposition ("horizontal composition"), then resource level is composed with the service level, and the resulting net is composed with the process level also through transition superposition ("vertical composition"). Transition superposition of nets is based on transition labels: two transitions of equal label in two separate nets are fused into a single one. Therefore if R i FT i S i E i P i F i are the sets of GSPN models representing resources, faults, services, errors, processes, and failure, and if is the transition superposition operator, then the full model of the system is given by 
Hierarchy and GSPN models for FEF
As stated in the introduction, inheritance can involve the structure of a class (attributes, operation names, and associations) as well as behaviour. In GSPN the inheritance of the structure of a class consists of 1) inheriting parameters (rate/weight, initial marking), results to be computed, constraints to be verified, and possibly adding new ones; 2) inheriting, and in case modifying, the labels associated to either places or transitions. Inheritance of the dynamic behavior of the super-class consists of either maintaining the same net structure in the sub-class or modifying it by applying transformation rules that preserve the behavioral inheritance [17] . Two main notions of behavioral inheritance are introduced in [17] : protocol inheritance and projection inheritance. Although they have been defined for labeled transition systems, it is rather straightforward to use them for the reachability graphs (RGs) of SPN models. Intuitively, let p and q be two SPN models representing the behavior of a class P and of its super-class Q, respectively; protocol inheritance can be verified by not allowing to fire transitions that are present in p and not in q (i.e., blocking new actions) and by checking whether the RGs of p and q are equivalent. Projection inheritance can be verified, instead, by considering not observable the transitions that are present in p and not in q (i.e., hiding the effect of new actions) and by checking whether the RGs of p and q are equivalent. In both cases, branching bisimulation [12] is used as equivalence relation. Branching bisimulation belongs to the class of observational equivalence, in which two systems are equivalent if an external observer cannot discriminate between them. Of course two systems may or may not be equivalent depending on what an observer is allowed to see. In our context an observer is allowed to see all transition labels, unless otherwise stated, that is to say the labels that are used to compose models.
The two basic notions of inheritance are combined [17] in order to obtain a stronger and a weaker notion. Stronger inheritance is preserved if both protocol and projection inheritance are satisfied. Life cycle inheritance is the weaker notion: the set of transitions present in p and not in q is partitioned into "not-observable" and "not-allowed to fire" such that the observable behavior of P equals the behavior of Q.
Let us consider in Figure 3 the Reachability Graphs (RGs) of three SPN models representing the behavior of different fault classes. Suppose (a) represents the behavior of a fault super-class. Then (b) represents the behavior of a fault sub-class that respects both protocol and projection inheritance. Indeed, if action disactivation is blocked the new behavior is never started, if instead actions disactivation and activation are considered internal their presence cannot be observed. The RG (c) represents the behavior of a fault subclass that respects only projection inheritance: hiding the highlighted actions in (c) the original behavior in (a) is preserved, but, if we block them, the fault gets stuck after its occurrence.
What are the modelling implications of these inheritance notions? Again, if p and q are GSPN models for class P and superclass Q respectively, if p verifies projection inheritance, then we know that, if the newly added actions of p are not visible and therefore not used for synchronization, then we can safely substitute p in any formula in which q is used, and still maintain the functional behaviour (that in Petri nets amount to the possible executions of the model in terms of observable actions). If p verifies protocol inheritance with respect to q, then we know that, if q is used in a 
¼ is able to execute all executions of r. Observe that the proposed rules for inheritance only consider the net functional behaviour, the stochastic behaviour may not be preserved, and usually it is not.
A library of GSPN component models for faults, errors and failures has been set up by exploiting a CD hierarchy description of faults, errors, and failures defined in the DepAuDE: they are presented in the following.
Fault Models
The classification of faults of Figure 4 (A) is taken from [4] and it is largely inspired by [8] : the root class of the inheritance tree describes a generic fault; the first level of the inheritance tree distinguishes Physical Fault, Design Fault, Interaction Fault and Malicious Logic. Physical faults are characterized by two input attributes that allow to specify the maximum time during which the fault is active and can be perceived by the system (duration) and the frequency of its occurrence (fault rate). Attribute fault dormancy, the length of time between the occurrence of a fault and the appearance of the corresponding error, is considered instead as a metric to be evaluated.
Physical Faults may be either considered permanent or temporary: their discrimination depends on the values assigned to the input attributes min-duration and max-duration as emphasized by the constraint written in the note symbol. Permanent physical faults and temporary physical faults are further specialized by several sub-classes. For example, temporary physical faults are discriminated in DevTemp Physical Faults, that is internal faults due to the development phase; Transient Physical Faults, that is faults induced by environmental phenomena; Intermittent Physical Faults, i.e., internal physical defects that become active depending on a particular point-wise condition.
Transient and intermittent physical faults classes are enriched with some input parameters, such as: latency rateN and latency rateB, representing the rate of transient fault activation in case of normal conditions and burst conditions, respectively, persistence rate, representing the rate of fault disactivation and latency rate, representing the rate of intermittent fault activation. Dotted boxes in Figure 4 (A) represent classes that are not described here, since the goal of the paper is not of being exhaustive, but to describe the use of inheritance for modelling the elements of the FEF chain. The interested reader can find a complete description in [4] .
GSPN component models for faults have been built according to the hierarchy view of Figure 4 (A): each GSPN model is an elaboration of previous generic Petri net models of fault generator proposed in [9] where only physical faults are considered and they are classified with respect to their persistence in permanent and temporary, the latter being further specialized in transient and intermittent.
In Figure 4 (B) each box is a labelled GSPN component: a GSPN net with a set of parameters, results to be computed, and constrains to be verified. For sake of graphical clarity the rates of transitions are not shown in the figure, ( Figure 4 (B) characterized by three states: the fault is not present (place no f t ), the fault is active and it may be perceived by a system entity (place act f t) and the fault is terminated (place gone f t). The fault occurrence is represented by the firing of transition f t occ, and when the fault is active it can be perceived (transition f t prcv) by a system entity, causing an error situation. Transition f t prcv is labeled so as to allow synchronization with the affected system entity (i.e., the resource model of Figure 2 ) and with an error model. The fault termination is represented by the firing of transition f t end. Since neither attributes nor constraints are specified for the Fault super-class, the lists of parameters, results and constraints of the corresponding GSPN model FT 0 are empty.
Classes Design Faults, Interaction Faults, Malicious Logic, and their corresponding sub-classes, present the same behavior of the more general class Fault, so that the GSPN model FT 0 is reused to represent these classes also.
The class Physical Faults is associated with the GSPN model FT 1 that inherits from FT 0 and adds to the parameter list fault rate and duration and to the result list fault dormancy. The parameters and the result correspond to the homonyms attributes defined in the Physical Fault class.
The net structure of FT 0 has been maintained, but rates of transitions f t occ and f t end have been defined as functions of the added parameters, i.e., w´f t occµ f ault rate and w´f t endµ 1 duration.
The behavior of Permanent Physical Faults and of Temporary Physical Faults classes is represented by the GSPN models FT 21 and FT 22 , respectively. Both the models inherit from model FT 1 , add a parameter (the parameter minduration for model FT 21 and the parameter max-duration for model FT 22 ) and maintain the same net as FT 1 . A fault is classified permanent if it lasts more than min-duration, and it is classified temporary if it lasts less than max-duration, with the constraints, derived from the note symbol of the CD of Figure 4(A) , that min-duration is greater than maxduration. The interaction of the models with the corresponding resource and error models (that amounts to the labels associated to transitions) is also inherited from FT 1 .
With respect to the fault models proposed in [9] , where permanent faults remain always active while temporary faults once occurred after a certain amount of time eventually disappear, both the fault models FT 21 and FT 22 are characterized by a termination state (i.e., place gone f t) and the represented fault classes are discriminated by the fault duration.
Temporary faults can still be distinguished into intermittent and transient faults. Intermittent faults, once occurred, are characterized by alternating periods in which they are active, and they can be perceived by the system entity, and periods in which they are latent and hence they do not cause any error. Transient faults, instead, disappear a certain amount of time after their activation; however, unlike generic temporary faults, they are characterized by a complex mechanism of activation that depends on the condition of the external environment.
The behavior of Transient Physical Faults class is represented by the GSPN model FT 31 in which a fault moves from the latent state to the active state with a different rate depending on the environment conditions. Under normal condition, represented by the place normal marked, transition lat-actN with rate parameter equal to latency rateN will fire, while under "burst" condition, represented by the place burst marked, transition lat-actB with rate parameter equal to latency rateB will fire.
The behavior of Intermittent Physical Faults class is represented by the GSPN model FT 32 , in which firing of transition act-lat (with rate parameter equal to persistence rate) brings the state of the fault from active to latent and, viceversa, firing of transition lat-act (with rate parameters equal to latency rate) changes the fault state from latent to active.
GSPN models FT 31 and FT 32 inherit from FT 22 : for the structure, new parameters have been added with respect to the parameter list of FT 22 and for FT 31 the parameter fault rate is now not relevant (and it has been set to the default value of 1), since the fault activation depends upon the two transitions lat-actN and lat-actB. From the behavioral point of view, the GSPN models FT 22 FT 32 and FT 31 are characterized by the RGs (a), (b) and (c) of Figure 3 , respectively; we can state then that the GSPN model FT 32 strongly inherits from FT 22 , i.e., it preserves both the projection and the protocol inheritance, while the GSPN model FT 31 preserves only the projection inheritance, that is to say, if any of the act-lat, lat-actN, and lat-actB is used in a synchronization with another model, then it may be the case that FT 31 is not able to act as FT 22 .
Finally
All the fault GSPN models described above can have more than one label for each transition; in particular, transition f t prcv is characterized by two labels: one is used to interact with the resource model affected by the fault and the other is used to interact with the corresponding error model.
Error Models
Errors are deviations from the correct state of the system that may cause a subsequent failure [7] ; they are caused by faults affecting the resources of the system and they are related to the services performed by the faulty resources. A classification of errors is given by the CD of Figure 5 (A), taken from [4] , that considers only errors caused by physical faults, and discriminate them depending on which type of resource has been affected. The type of resources considered in DepAuDE are processing, memory, and communication.
The super-class Error of the hierarchy/logical view is modeled by the GSPN ER 0 -shown in Figure 5 (B). The class is characterized by two attributes that are mapped in two results to be computed on ER 0 : error latency, the length of time between the occurrence of an error and the appearance of the corresponding failure, and PE, the probability of error. Note that for some results, as PE, it is already possible to give their definitions, since their computation is based only on local information; the definition of other results, as error latency, requires instead information on the whole system.
The GSPN model ER 0 is characterized by four states: the error is not present (place no err), the error is generated (place pot err), the error is occurred (place error) and the error has been detected (detected). Places error and detected are used to define the result PE as the probability that one of the places is marked. The error can be caused by either a fault occurred in a resource or by the error propagation effect: the error generation is represented by the firing of transition cause that is labeled so as to ensure synchronization with caused fault or error model. The labels are derived from the associations effect(Fault, Error) and association Eeffect(Error,Error) of the CD of Figure 5(A) . In general, ER 0 contain as many transition "cause" (i.e., with input place no err and with output place pot err) as the number of GSPN models representing potential causes of the error. The occurrence of the error in the corresponding service is represented by the firing of transition err occ, properly labeled to ensure synchronization with the service model. 
Failure Models
Failures are deviations of the service delivered by the system with respect to the system intended function. The CD shown in Figure 6 (A) associates to a generic failure mode two metrics to be computed and verified: PF, i.e., the probability of failure, and RF, rate of failure. The CD represents a classification of failures with respect to the their impact on the system, that is whether their occurrences are considered acceptable or not depending on the criticality level associated to the system process they affect. The different failure mode assumptions are represented by the subclasses: Halting Failure, Degrading Failure and Repairing Failure. Halting failures cause the system activity not to be any longer perceptible by the user. Depending whether the absence of system activity takes form of a frozen output or of silence, they are further classified in passive failures and in silent failures, respectively. Degrading failures still allow the system to provide a subset of its specified behavior. Repairing Failure requires instead that faulty resources originating the failure be replaced or repaired before the system activity continues. Repairing actions are undertaken during the failure treatment step and are performed by proper mechanisms (association address).
The failure hierarchy of Figure 6 (A), defined in [4] can be exploited to construct GSPN model components representing different failure modes. The main purpose of GSPN models representing failure modes is to synthesize in a unique place the set of (erroneous) states that have equivalent consequences on the system. These models correspond to the failure mode layer described in [14] that allows to arrange an SPN model in a manner suitable for the analysis of different levels of service degradation. In Figure 6 (B) two skeletons of GSPN models representing a generic failure mode and a repairing failure mode, respectively, are depicted. The model F 0 is characterized by three main states: no fail, pot fail and fail, respectively meaning the absence of failure, the occurrence of the error conditions causing it and the failure occurrence. Several error conditions may cause the occurrence of a failure: the firing of transition cond i represents the occurrence of one of such conditions; since, in general, the failure occurrence is caused by a combination of errors, cond i is a multi-labeled transition with labels derived from association effect(Error, Failure) for synchronization with the error models. Transition fail occ has to be synchronized with a System Component model, so that its label is derived from association affect (Failure, SystemComponent) .
Concerning the result list, the GSPN model is characterized by two metrics derived from the homonyms attributes of Failure class: PF, defined as the probability the place fail is marked, and RF defined as the throughput of transition fail occ.
Model F 1 , representing a repairing failure mode, contains one transition more with respect to F 0 : fail repair that is an interface transition to be synchronized with reconfiguration mechanism models. Model F 1 respects protocol inheritance.
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a modelling of faults, errors, and failures based on inheritance. Starting from a UML Class Diagram description of faults (errors/failures) that is based on a hierarchy relationship among classes, a hierarchy of GSPN models for faults (errors/failures) has been provided. If a class P inherits from Q then the modeller can derive a GSPN model p for objects of type P starting from a GSPN model q already defined for objects of type Q, hence by reusing input parameters and result definitions of q. An additional support to the modeller is provided by the definition of equivalence notions associated to inheritance, that provide indications on how safely a GSPN p can substitute q into a larger model obtained through GSPN composition. Verification of equivalence notions on Petri Net models can be carried out by means of efficient algorithms [18] .
Inherited models are usually more detailed with respect to super-class models and this may be an issue for the analysis. However, the compositional approach makes the model complexity issue more tractable since it is always possible to discriminate those critical parts of the system that need to be modelled in detail, (i.e, by means of sub-class models) from the rest of the system that can be modelled by using model component at an higher level of abstraction (i.e, by means of super-class models). On the other hand, for complex models simulation is always a feasible analysis technique.
The GSPN models described in this paper have been defined as part of the EEC project DepAuDE whose main application field was automation system, as such they may not be totally adequate in other application fields, but we think that the basic idea of inheritance and a large part of the GSPN hierarchy of FEF models, in particular those for faults, can be of help also in other application fields. This is indeed a subject for additional investigation.
The notion of inheritance used has been defined for untimed Petri nets, an interesting field of study would be the definition of inheritance notions that preserves also some type of stochastic behaviour, whether this may amount to lumpability or to more sophisticated notions as stochastic ordering is definitely still to be investigated. 
